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DEFERENCE TO A HEARING PANEL?: 
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH DAKOTA— 
2004-2007 
KATHARINE TRAYLOR SCHAFFZIN∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past year, the North Dakota legal community has come under 
attack from the popular press.  Headlines have announced “Lawyers 
Violating Behavior Policies,”1 “Attorney Discipline Most in Decades,”2 
“Attorney Loses Law License,”3 “N.D. Supreme Court Reprimands 
Attorney,”4 and “[West Fargo] Attorney Facing Another Sex Charge.”5  
News articles detail the sordid tales of one attorney soliciting sex from fe-
male clients in lieu of payment6 and another charging a client $275 an hour 
for work performed by his legal assistant.7 
The reality, however, is that much of the attention drawn from the press 
can be attributed to the conduct of very few.  Since 2004, the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota has ruled on only twenty-one recommendations 
from hearing panels for the dismissal, reprimand, suspension, or disbarment 
of an attorney licensed to practice in the State.8  Each of those twenty-one 
cases can be categorized as involving either incompetence or lack of 
diligence, fraud, misappropriation, conflicts of interest, unreasonable fees, 
unauthorized practice of law, harassment or intimidation, or sexual miscon-
duct.  Despite the racy headlines, only one of those cases involved any 
alleged sexual misconduct by a member of the bar.9 
 
 ∗Katharine Traylor Schaffzin is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of North 
Dakota School of Law.  She is grateful to Darrell Sproles for his excellent research assistance. 
1. Steven P. Wagner, Lawyers Violating Behavior Policies, FARGO FORUM, Dec. 10, 2006, at 
A1. 
2. Attorney Discipline Most in Decades, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 16, 2006, available at 
http://bismarcktribune.com/articles/2006/12/16/news/state/125288.txt. 
3. Attorney Loses Law License, FARGO FORUM, Nov. 14, 2006, at A6. 
4. N.D. Supreme Court Reprimands Attorney, FARGO FORUM, Dec. 6, 2006, at A12. 
5. W F. Attorney Facing Another Sex Charge, FARGO FORUM, Nov. 18, 2006, at A9. 
6. Id. 
7. Janell Cole, Court to Decide if Fee Was Fair, FARGO FORUM, Jan. 10, 2006, at A7. 
8. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of each of the twenty-one cases considered by 
the North Dakota Supreme Court.  Not included in the total or addressed in this article are cases 
involving only orders of interim suspension or discipline against judicial officers. 
9. In re Chinquist, 2006 ND 107, ¶ 4, 714 N.W.2d 469, 471. 
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This article reviews the disposition of each report and recommendation 
by a hearing panel of the disciplinary board considered by the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota for final disposition since 2004.  The article 
identifies three factors as distinguishable from others which may have some 
bearing on the disposition of those cases.  Specifically, in every case where 
an attorney has consented to discipline, the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
has adopted the report and recommendation of the hearing panel.  In one 
third of all cases in which an attorney has instead objected to the report and 
recommendation of the hearing panel, the court has rejected the 
recommendation of the hearing panel and instead issued a harsher sanction 
than the one to which the attorney in question initially objected.  In another 
third of those cases where the attorney has objected, the court has none-
theless issued the recommended sanction.  And, in the final third of such 
cases, the court has issued a sanction less severe than that which the hearing 
panel recommended; those three cases proved to be the only instances since 
2004 where the court imposed a sanction less than that recommended by a 
hearing panel.  Additionally, the decision of disciplinary counsel to object 
to the hearing panel’s report and recommendation has also proven signifi-
cant.  More often than not, when the court has considered an objection of 
disciplinary counsel, the court has also rejected the recommendation of the 
hearing panel and instead issued a harsher sanction against the attorney. 
At least in the recent past, an attorney facing disciplinary charges has 
been generally better off consenting to discipline, rather than facing the 
distinct possibility that the court could issue a sanction more severe than 
that proposed by the hearing panel.10  In Part II, this article briefly outlines 
the process of disciplining attorneys in North Dakota.  Part III provides a 
brief summary of the facts, procedure, and legal analysis of each of the 
twenty-one cases the court has addressed since 2004.  Part IV demonstrates 
the emerging pattern of the court in considering disciplinary cases.  Finally, 
in Part V, this article concludes that attorneys facing disciplinary charges 
before the current court may receive a harsher sanction from the court by 
failing to consent to the sanction suggested by a hearing panel. 
II. THE NORTH DAKOTA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 
All disciplinary actions commenced against an attorney in North 
Dakota are subject to the same disciplinary process.  A surface comprehen-
sion of this process is necessary to an understanding of the recent discipli-
nary cases considered by the Supreme Court of North Dakota.  Because this 
 
10. See infra Part IV for a detailed explanation of emerging trends in recent supreme court 
disciplinary cases. 
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article concludes that, in the recent past, an attorney who challenged the 
discipline suggested by a hearing panel was likely to receive a harsher 
sanction than an attorney who consented to the sanction proposed by that 
panel, the reader must have some familiarity with the role of a hearing panel 
and the supreme court in the disciplinary process. 
The disciplinary process commences in one of two ways.  Most com-
monly, a member of the public may file a complaint with the disciplinary 
board of the Supreme Court of North Dakota.11  Additionally, the discipli-
nary board or an inquiry committee may initiate disciplinary proceedings 
against an attorney on the motion of the board or inquiry committee.12 
In response to a complaint or motion, the disciplinary board com-
mences disciplinary proceedings.  The case is then assigned to the inquiry 
committee13 with jurisdiction in the locale where the attorney in question is 
located.  The chair of that committee reviews the complaint to determine 
whether it states grounds for discipline.14  If the complaint survives 
summary dismissal by the chair of the appropriate inquiry committee, the 
chair will assign the case to either a member of the inquiry committee or to 
disciplinary counsel to conduct an investigation.15  The lawyer accused of 
wrongdoing is required to file a written response to the complaint and the 
complainant is offered the opportunity to file a written response thereto.16 
At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigating member will 
prepare a report of his or her findings and distribute it to the members of the 
inquiry committee.17  The inquiry committee will consider the report at its 
next meeting, where both the complainant and the responding attorney will 
be invited to appear.18  There, the committee can dismiss the complaint, 
order diversion from discipline to a lawyer assistance program, issue an 
admonition, order a consent probation, or instruct disciplinary counsel to 
file a formal petition with the disciplinary board.19  Absent an appeal or the 
 
11. Paul W. Jacobson, The Discipline Process 2 (Feb. 26, 2007) (unpublished handout pre-
sented at The Disciplinary Process, Trust Accounts, & Recent North Dakota Disciplinary Cases 
continuing legal education seminar, on file with the North Dakota Law Review). 
12. Id. at 1. 
13. An inquiry committee is composed of six members of the North Dakota Bar and three 
members of the public; each member of an inquiry committee is appointed by the president of the 
State Bar Association of North Dakota for a period of three years.  Id. at 2.  Three inquiry 




17. Id. at 3. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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filing of a petition by disciplinary counsel, the proceeding ends without 
involvement of the supreme court. 
Once instructed to do so by an inquiry committee, disciplinary counsel 
will file a petition with the disciplinary board20 against the attorney in ques-
tion.21  The attorney is again required to answer the petition or the board 
will deem the allegations contained therein admitted.22  The chair of the 
disciplinary board will then appoint a hearing panel from among current or 
former members of the board,23 which panel will conduct a hearing into the 
allegations of the petition.  The hearing panel then disposes of the matter by 
dismissing the petition, issuing a reprimand, ordering a consent probation, 
or filing a report of its findings and recommendations to the supreme court 
that the court reprimand, suspend, or disbar the attorney.24 
If neither the attorney nor disciplinary counsel appeal the order of 
dismissal, reprimand, or consent probation, the disciplinary proceeding is 
concluded.  If either party to the petition appeals such an order, however, 
the supreme court will consider the matter.25  Additionally, the court will 
consider the matter if the hearing panel files a report of its findings and 
recommendations.26  The court may then consider the briefs and oral 
arguments of the parties before rendering its decision to dismiss the petition 
or to issue sanctions. 
III. RECENT NORTH DAKOTA DISCIPLINARY CASES 
Since 2004, only twenty-one cases involving attorney discipline have 
reached the Supreme Court of North Dakota for final decision.27  Because 
those cases are organized on the basis of the attorney in question, rather 
 
20. The disciplinary board is comprised of seven lawyers (one from each judicial district) 
and three members of the public at large.  Id. at 5.  The supreme court appoints the attorney mem-
bers of the board after selecting each from a list of three nominees prepared by the State Bar 
Association of North Dakota’s Board of Governors.  Id.  A committee consisting of the president 
of the State Bar Association, the Attorney General of the State of North Dakota, and the chair of 
the Judicial Conference nominates the members of the public at large.  Id.  All members serve 
terms of three years and are limited to serving two consecutive terms.  Id. 
21. Id.  Additionally, disciplinary counsel may at any time file with the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota evidence that the attorney has committed misconduct and presents a substantial 
threat to the public accompanied by a proposed form of order for interim suspension.  Id. at 9.  
The court may, thus, order the immediate suspension of an attorney while the formal proceedings 
continue.  Id. 
22. Id. at 5. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 6. 
26. Id. 
27. Not included in this total are cases involving orders of interim suspension or discipline 
against judicial officers.  For an explanation of an order of interim suspension, see supra note 21. 
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than by each specific instance of alleged misconduct, disciplinary cases 
reaching the supreme court often involve multiple and distinct instances of 
misconduct.28  Thus, these cases often defy classification into only one type 
of violation of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct.  Nonethe-
less, this article classifies each case by the most apparent type of alleged 
violation: incompetence or lack of diligence, fraud, misappropriation, con-
flicts of interest, unreasonable fees, unauthorized practice, harassment or 
intimidation, or sexual misconduct.  A discussion of each of the twenty-one 
cases addressed by the court follows. 
A. INCOMPETENCE OR LACK OF DILIGENCE 
In the past four years, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has heard 
more disciplinary actions alleging attorney incompetence or lack of dili-
gence than any other violation.  The sanctions imposed for such violations 
have ranged from dismissal to disbarment.  The violations involved Rules 
1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 3.3 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, 
regarding competence, diligence, communication, and candor to the tribunal 
respectively. 
In the first of these cases considered since 2004, In re Secrest,29 the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota accepted the recommendation of a hearing 
panel that the court reprimand Attorney T.L. Secrest for failing to commu-
nicate to his client or the trustees of her irrevocable trust that the purpose of 
creating the trust was to minimize estate taxes, thus failing to give effect to 
the purpose of the trust.30  Attorney Secrest stipulated that his actions vio-
lated Rule 1.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Responsibility,31 
requiring competence, and Rule 1.4,32 requiring adequate communication 
with a client.33  Accordingly, he consented to the discipline recommended 
by the hearing panel—reprimand.34  In light of the agreement between dis-
ciplinary counsel and Attorney Secrest, the court issued a reprimand.35 
 
28. E.g., In re Chinquist, 2006 ND 107, ¶ 5, 714 N.W.2d 469, 471 (considering 
misappropriation and sexual misconduct). 
29. 2004 ND 180, 687 N.W.2d 251. 
30. In re Secrest, ¶ 2, 687 N.W.2d at 252. 
31. Rule 1.1 provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representa-
tion to a client.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1. 
32. Rule 1.4(b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”  N.D. R. 
PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4(b). 
33. In re Secrest, ¶ 2, 687 N.W.2d at 252. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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One month later, in In re Peterson,36 the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota rejected the recommendation of a hearing panel that Donald L. 
Peterson be suspended for one year and, instead, ordered his disbarment.37  
In that case, Attorney Peterson agreed to represent Robert Taylor in his ap-
peal of a divorce action, although he allegedly never pursued such an ap-
peal, as well as in bringing a contempt proceeding against Taylor’s ex-
wife.38  On May 15, 2003, Taylor called the Ward County Clerk’s office 
and determined that Peterson had not yet filed the contempt proceeding, in 
direct contravention of Peterson’s alleged statement to Taylor only one day 
earlier.39  Peterson did not file the contempt proceeding until May 16, 2003, 
when he included an affidavit allegedly notarized by Peterson and pur-
portedly signed by Taylor under oath.40  Taylor did not sign the affidavit.41 
In another matter, Peterson’s client allegedly retained a new attorney to 
inquire into the status of his case after Peterson allegedly failed to commu-
nicate with him.42  Peterson allegedly told the new attorney that the case 
had been dismissed and allegedly prepared an order dismissing the com-
plaint purportedly signed by Judge Gary A. Holum; Judge Holum did not 
sign such an order.43 
The hearing panel found violations of Rule 1.4 of the North Dakota 
Rules of Professional Conduct,44 requiring communication, and Rule 3.3,45 
requiring candor to the tribunal, among others.46  Accordingly, the hearing 
panel recommended that the court suspend Peterson for one year.47  Al-
though neither Peterson nor disciplinary counsel filed objections to the 
report of the hearing panel, the court requested that both parties file briefs 
on the issue.48  Because Peterson’s conduct involved false swearing and 
dishonesty, fraud, or deceit reflecting adversely on his fitness to practice 
 
36. 2004 ND 205, 689 N.W.2d 364. 
37. In re Peterson, ¶ 13, 689 N.W.2d at 366. 
38. Id. ¶ 2, 689 N.W.2d at 364. 




43. Id. ¶ 7, 689 N.W.2d at 365. 
44. Rule 1.4(b) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representa-
tion.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4(b). 
45. Rule 3.3(1) & (2) provides in pertinent part that “a lawyer shall not knowingly make a 
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”  
N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3(1) & (2). 
46. In re Peterson, ¶ 12, 689 N.W.2d at 365. 
47. Id. at 366. 
48. Id. 
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law, the court rejected the recommended sanction of the hearing panel and 
instead ordered disbarment.49 
More than six months later, in In re Edin,50 a hearing panel recom-
mended a six-month suspension for attorney Charles T. Edin for his lack of 
diligence and communication in multiple cases.51  Edin admitted that his 
conduct violated Rule 1.3 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional 
Conduct,52 requiring diligence, and Rule 1.4,53 requiring communication, 
among others.54  Nonetheless, disciplinary counsel filed objections to the 
hearing panel’s recommendation, arguing that Edin’s neglect in pursuing 
his clients’ cases amounted to abandonment of his practice; disciplinary 
counsel asked the Supreme Court of North Dakota to issue a two-year 
suspension.55  The court rejected the recommendation of the hearing panel 
and instead issued the two-year suspension disciplinary counsel had 
requested.56 
Later that same month, the supreme court suspended William P. Vela 
for one-year, accepting a hearing panel’s finding that Vela neglected his 
client’s application for asylum.57  In Vela, an immigration judge instructed 
Attorney Vela on May 14, 2001, to collect and present evidence prior to the 
next hearing on July 2, 2003, that his client’s Nepalese passport was fake.58  
Despite having two years to collect and present such evidence, Vela 
allegedly failed to do so and allegedly failed to even notify his client that he 
needed to collect such information.59  The hearing panel found that Vela’s 
conduct violated Rule 1.3 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional 
Conduct,60 requiring diligence, and Rule 1.4,61 requiring communication, 
 
49. Id. 
50. 2005 ND 109, 697 N.W.2d 727. 
51. In re Edin, ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 728-29. 
52. Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.3. 
53. Rule 1.4 provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4. 
54. In re Edin, ¶¶ 2-8, 697 N.W.2d at 729-30. 
55. Id. ¶¶ 8-10, 697 N.W.2d at 730-31. 
56. Id. ¶ 14, 697 N.W.2d at 731. 
57. In re Vela, 2005 ND 119, ¶ 14, 699 N.W.2d 839, 841. 
58. Id. ¶ 4, 699 N.W.2d at 840. 
59. Id. 
60. Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.3. 
61. Rule 1.4 provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representa-
tion.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4. 
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among others, and recommended a one-year suspension.62  The court found 
that Vela’s untimely letter objections to the recommendation of the hearing 
panel were insufficient to avoid a determination that the accusations against 
Vela should be deemed admitted.63  Thus, the court adopted the recommen-
dation of the hearing panel and issued a one-year suspension.64 
The following month, the Supreme Court of North Dakota, in In re 
Sundby,65 accepted a hearing panel’s recommendation that the court 
suspend Elizabeth Jane Sundby for six months for her lack of diligence in 
seven matters and her failure to communicate with six clients.66  Sundby 
stipulated that her misconduct violated Rule 1.3 of the North Dakota Rules 
of Professional Conduct,67 requiring diligence, and Rule 1.4,68 requiring 
communication, among others.69  The court ordered a six-month suspen-
sion, to which Sundby consented.70 
Several weeks later, the Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to 
sanction attorney Michael R. Hoffman after he incorrectly calculated the 
filing deadline for his client’s petition for post-conviction relief.71  In 
Hoffman, Attorney Hoffman objected to the hearing panel’s recommen-
dation that the court issue a reprimand.72  The court agreed with Hoffman 
after determining that Hoffman’s actions constituted a singular act of 
negligence, unlikely to recur, for which no sanction was warranted.73  
Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint.74 
The following year, in In re McKechnie,75 the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota ordered a two-year suspension for William E. McKechnie after he 
failed to timely appeal the denial of post-conviction relief on behalf of his 
client and after he failed to refund the unearned portion of another client’s 
retainer after he received an interim suspension.76  A hearing panel 
 
62. In re Vela, ¶ 13, 699 N.W.2d at 841. 
63. Id. ¶ 7, 699 N.W.2d at 840. 
64. Id. ¶ 14, 699 N.W.2d at 841. 
65. 2005 ND 135, 701 N.W.2d 863. 
66. In re Sunby, ¶ 17, 701 N.W.2d at 865. 
67. Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.3. 
68. Rule 1.4 provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representa-
tion.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4. 
69. In re Sundby, ¶ 10, 701 N.W.2d at 864. 
70. Id. ¶ 12, 701 N.W.2d at 865. 
71. In re Hoffman, 2005 ND 153, ¶ 18, 703 N.W.2d 345, 352. 
72. Id. ¶ 1, 703 N.W.2d at 346. 
73. Id. ¶ 17, 703 N.W.2d at 352. 
74. Id. ¶ 19. 
75. 2006 ND 2, 708 N.W.2d 310. 
76. In re McKechnie, ¶¶ 11-15, 708 N.W.2d at 312. 
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concluded that McKechnie violated Rule 1.1 of the North Dakota Rules of 
Professional Conduct, requiring competence,77 Rule 1.3, requiring dili-
gence,78  and Rule 1.5,79 requiring that fees be reasonable, among others.80  
Attorney McKechnie stipulated to the alleged misconduct and consented to 
the two-year suspension recommended by the hearing panel.81  Accord-
ingly, the court issued a two-year suspension.82 
Later that same year, in In re Balerud,83 the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota suspended Lee J. Balerud for six months for missing scheduled 
client meetings and a mediation, for arriving late to multiple court appear-
ances, and for disorganization throughout the representation of his client, 
allegedly resulting in an unfavorable jury verdict against his client.84  In 
reaching its decision, the court considered the findings of the hearing panel 
that Balerud’s conduct violated Rule 1.1 of the North Dakota Rules of 
Professional Conduct,85 requiring competence, and Rule 1.3,86 requiring 
diligence, among others.87  Hearing no objection to the report and recom-
mendation of the hearing panel, the court accepted its recommendation and 
ordered Balerud suspended for six months.88 
B. FRAUD 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has heard five disciplinary cases 
involving fraud or deceit since 2004.  The sanctions ordered have varied 
from a public reprimand to disbarment. 
In 2005, the supreme court followed the recommendations of separate 
hearing panels that the court disbar attorneys Richard C. Wilkes89 and 
Thomas K. Schoppert.90  In both cases, the attorneys at issue had been 
 
77. Rule 1.1 provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1. 
78. Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.3. 
79. Rule 1.5(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.”  N.D. R. 
PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a). 
80. In re McKechnie, ¶ 8, 708 N.W.2d at 311. 
81. Id. ¶ 8,11, 708 N.W.2d at 311-12. 
82. Id. ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 312. 
83. 2006 ND 164, 719 N.W.2d 329. 
84. In re Balerud, ¶ 14, 719 N.W.2d at 331. 
85. Rule 1.1 provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representa-
tion to a client.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1. 
86. Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.3. 
87. In re Balerud, ¶ 8, 719 N.W.2d at 330. 
88. Id. ¶ 14, 719 N.W.2d at 331. 
89. In re Wilkes, 2005 ND 168, ¶ 7, 704 N.W.2d 809, 809. 
90. In re Schoppert, 2005 ND 45, ¶ 6, 693 N.W.2d 19, 20. 
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convicted on tax evasion charges.91  The respective hearing panels recom-
mended disbarment, to which both attorneys consented.92  Accordingly, the 
court in each instance ordered disbarment.93 
The following year, the court suspended John T. Korsmo for six 
months after his sentence of probation for making false and fictitious state-
ments in a federal investigation.94  In In re Korsmo, Korsmo affirmatively 
denied knowledge of how the Clayburgh campaign obtained the contact 
information of Home Loan Bank executives invited to a fundraising event.95  
Korsmo later claimed that his spouse forwarded the names to the campaign, 
although he had denied having knowledge of that fact when initially 
questioned in the investigation.96 
A hearing panel found that Korsmo violated Rule 1.2(A)(2) of the 
North Dakota Rules of Lawyer Discipline97 because his conduct reflected 
adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law.98  
Because providing the information to the Clayburgh campaign was not 
illegal, the hearing panel found that Korsmo’s act in lying to cover up such 
action was mitigated and recommended a two-year suspension.99  Attorney 
Korsmo filed objections to the hearing panel’s recommended sanction.100 
The court agreed with the hearing panel that disbarment was inappro-
priate in light of the mitigating circumstances, but rejected its recommen-
dation of a two-year suspension.101  Because Korsmo’s statement was not 
made under oath and conferred no personal benefit to him, the court found 
that a lesser sanction of a six-month suspension beginning at the end of his 
criminal probation was a sufficient sanction.102 
Later that same year, the Supreme Court of North Dakota ordered only 
a reprimand of Attorney William P. Harrie where an insurance carrier 
retained him to represent an insured driver who had died since her involve-
ment in a car accident.103  In In re Edison, Harrie had served an answer to 
 
91. In re Wilkes, ¶ 2, 704 N.W.2d at 809; In re Schoppert, ¶ 1, 693 N.W.2d at 20. 
92. In re Wilkes, ¶¶ 2, 5, 704 N.W.2d at 809; In re Schoppert, ¶¶ 3-4, 693 N.W.2d at 20. 
93. In re Wilkes, ¶ 7, 704 N.W.2d at 809; In re Schoppert, ¶ 6, 693 N.W.2d at 20. 
94. In re Korsmo, 2006 ND 148, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d 6, 9. 
95. Id. ¶ 3, 718 N.W.2d at 7. 
96. Id. 
97. Rule 1.2(A)(2) provides in pertinent part that a lawyer violates the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline if his or her conduct “reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or 
fitness as a lawyer.”  N.D. R. LAWYER DISCIPLINE 1.2(A)(2). 
98. In re Korsmo, ¶ 5, 718 N.W.2d at 7. 
99. Id. ¶ 4. 
100. Id. ¶ 5. 
101. Id. ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 8. 
102. Id. ¶ 9, 718 N.W.2d at 8-9. 
103. In re Edison, 2006 ND 250, ¶ 18, 724 N.W.2d 579, 585. 
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plaintiff’s complaint on March 27, 2002, nine days after receiving the file 
and fourteen days before learning that the driver was deceased.104  On the 
same day that Harrie learned of his client’s death, he allegedly filed an 
amended answer alleging insufficient service.105  After receiving proof of 
service from plaintiff’s counsel, Harrie informed opposing counsel that his 
client was dead at the time of service rendering service on her husband 
improper.106  Harrie won summary judgment against the plaintiff because 
the statute of limitations had run, but the court reversed and remanded to 
determine whether the defendant was equitably estopped from arguing that 
the statute of limitations had run.107 
A hearing panel ordered the dismissal of the disciplinary complaint 
after finding that Harrie did not knowingly deceive opposing counsel in 
filing the answer to the complaint without notifying plaintiff’s counsel that 
the driver was deceased.108  In response, disciplinary counsel petitioned the 
court for review of the hearing panel’s disposition of the matter.109  Al-
though Attorney Harrie opposed the petition of disciplinary counsel,110 the 
court reviewed the hearing panel’s decision and found that Harrie violated 
Rule 4.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Responsibility,111 
among others, when he filed the amended complaint with actual knowledge 
that his client was dead.112  Accordingly, the court issued a public 
reprimand.113 
That same week, in In re Stensland,114 the court issued the harsher 
sanction of a sixty-day suspension against Monty J. Stensland when he 
allegedly falsely signed his client’s name on a bankruptcy petition.115  
William Stuckey retained Stensland to file a bankruptcy petition on his 
behalf before new bankruptcy laws took effect on October 15, 2005.116  
When Stuckey was unable to contact Stensland as the deadline for filing 
approached, he retained another attorney, who filed the petition on October 
 
104. Id. ¶ 3, 724 N.W.2d at 580-81. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. ¶ 4. 
108. Id. ¶ 6, 724 N.W.2d at 582. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. ¶ 8. 
111. Rule 4.1 provides that “a lawyer shall not make a statement to a third person of fact or 
law that the lawyer knows to be false.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 4.1. 
112. Id. ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d at 584. 
113. Id. ¶ 18, 724 N.W.2d at 585. 
114. 2006 ND 251, 725 N.W.2d 191. 
115. In re Stensland, ¶ 12, 725 N.W.2d at 193. 
116. Id. ¶ 2, 725 N.W.2d at 191. 
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14, 2005.117  One hour and a quarter after Stuckey’s new attorney filed his 
petition, Stensland filed a petition on Stuckey’s behalf, bearing a signature 
for Stuckey not in Stuckey’s own handwriting.118 
A hearing panel found that Stensland violated Rule 3.3 of the North 
Dakota Rules of Professional Responsibility,119 among others, when he 
allegedly signed Stuckey’s name under penalty of perjury although he had 
no authorization to sign on Stuckey’s behalf.120  In the absence of any 
objection by Attorney Stensland, the court followed the recommendation of 
the hearing panel and suspended Stensland for sixty days.121 
C. MISAPPROPRIATION 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has sanctioned only three attor-
neys since 2004 for conduct involving the mishandling of client funds.  Not 
surprisingly, the sanctions varied from public reprimand to disbarment 
depending on the harm the client in each case suffered. 
In 2005, the court followed the recommendation of a hearing panel that 
the court reprimand Michael Ward for his alleged negligence in failing to 
keep duplicate billing records.122  In In re Ward, a hearing panel determined 
that Ward violated Rule 1.15(f) of the North Dakota Rules of Professional 
Conduct123 by allegedly failing to keep duplicate billing records of fees paid 
in advance and failing to fully account for a portion of those fees paid.124  
Although both disciplinary counsel and Attorney Ward filed objections to 
the report and recommendation of the hearing panel,125 the court determined 
that Ward’s negligence warranted the reprimand that the hearing panel 
recommended.126 
The next year, the Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected a hearing 
panel’s recommendation of a thirty-day suspension for C. Charles Chinquist 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id. ¶ 3. 
119. Rule 3.3 provides in pertinent part that “a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false 
statement of fact or law to a tribunal or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”  N.D. R. 
PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3. 
120. In re Stensland, ¶ 8, 725 N.W.2d at 192-93. 
121. Id. ¶ 9, 725 N.W.2d at 193. 
122. In re Ward, 2005 ND 144, ¶ 17, 701 N.W.2d 873, 878. 
123. Rule 1.15(f) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall maintain or cause to be 
maintained on a current basis records sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of 
this rule.  Such records shall be preserved for at least six years after termination of the representa-
tion.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(f). 
124. In re Ward, ¶ 4, 701 N.W.2d at 875. 
125. Id. ¶ 15, 701 N.W.2d at 878.  Disciplinary counsel argued that the court should suspend 
Attorney Ward.  Id.  Attorney Ward argued that an admonishment would be more appropriate.  Id. 
126. Id. ¶ 16. 
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in In re Chinquist127 and, instead, ordered a suspension of six months.128  
That case involved allegations that Chinquist failed to safekeep his client’s 
property or to properly keep records regarding his bills or fees paid.129  
Chinquist began representing a female client in her attempt to regain cus-
tody of her child after a period of incarceration, although the two never 
entered into a written fee agreement.130  The client allegedly paid Chinquist 
“between $13,500 and $15,000 in the form of money orders and cash 
delivered to Chinquist’s home and office in a manila envelope, a Cracker 
Jack box, and an Altoids tin.”131  He allegedly failed to provide the client 
with any billing statements or any accounting of fees paid during the repre-
sentation and he allegedly failed to deposit any fees received from the client 
into a trust account.132  Additionally, Chinquist allegedly stopped keeping 
time records related to the representation early on and, upon his interim 
suspension, allegedly shredded whatever documentation he had kept.133 
In addition to the misconduct alleged regarding Chinquist’s fees and 
billing practices, Chinquist allegedly engaged in a sexual relationship with 
his client after determining that she was legally emotionally disabled.134  At 
some point before custody of her son was restored, Chinquist told her that 
he could no longer represent her in the custody matter.135 
A hearing panel considered the petition against Chinquist and deter-
mined that Chinquist’s fee and billing practices violated Rules 1.5(a) and 
(b) and 1.15(a) and (f) of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, 
among others.136  The hearing panel, however, determined that Chinquist 
 
127. 2006 ND 107, 714 N.W.2d 469. 
128. In re Chinquist, ¶ 24, 714 N.W.2d at 476. 
129. Id. ¶ 3, 714 N.W.2d at 470-71. 
130. Id. ¶ 2, 714 N.W.2d at 470. 
131. Id. ¶ 3.  The client in this case also paid Chinquist $5000 to be applied to the fees due 
from another client in an unrelated matter.  Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 471. 
134. Id. ¶ 4. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. ¶ 6.  Rule 1.5(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.”  
N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a).  Rule 1.5(b) provides in pertinent part that, “[w]hen the lawyer 
has not regularly represented the client, the basis, rate, or amount of the fee shall be commu-
nicated to the client before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.”  
N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT  1.5(b).  Rule 1.15(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall 
hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a 
representation separate from the lawyer’s own property.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(a).  
Rule 1.15(f) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall maintain or cause to be maintained on 
a current basis records sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of this rule.  Such 
records shall be preserved for at least six years after termination of the representation.”  N.D. R. 
PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(f). 
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did not violate Rule 1.7(a)137 when he allegedly engaged in a sexual 
relationship with an emotionally disabled client during representation 
related to a custody matter.138  The hearing panel recommended a thirty-day 
suspension.139 
Disciplinary counsel and Attorney Chinquist each objected to the 
report and recommendation of the hearing panel.140  Disciplinary counsel 
urged the court to issue a two-year suspension against Chinquist,141 while 
Chinquist himself argued that a reprimand was a more appropriate sanc-
tion.142  The court accepted that part of the hearing panel’s report which 
found that Chinquist’s fee and billing practices violated Rules 1.5(a) and (b) 
and 1.15(a) and (f) of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct.143  
The court, however, rejected that part of the hearing panel’s report finding 
that Chinquist did not violate Rule 1.7(a) when he engaged in a sexual rela-
tionship with his emotionally disabled client.144  Upon finding this addi-
tional violation and in light of other aggravating factors, the court issued a 
six-month suspension.145 
In In re Buresh,146 decided the following year, the court disbarred 
Eugene F. Buresh for allegedly misappropriating client funds.147  In that 
case, Buresh allegedly deposited the proceeds of the sale of a client’s farm 
into his office trust fund account and then used $28,500 from that fund to 
pay office expenses.148  A hearing panel found that Buresh violated Rules 
1.15(a) and (b) of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct149 by 
 
137. Rule 1.7(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out a course of action on behalf of the client will 
be adversely affected by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by 
the lawyer’s own interests.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7(a). 
138. In re Chinquist, ¶ 6, 714 N.W.2d at 471. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. ¶ 1, 714 N.W.2d at 470. 
141. Id. ¶ 8, 714 N.W.2d at 475. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. ¶ 9, 714 N.W.2d at 472-73. 
144. Id. ¶ 18, 714 N.W.2d at 475. 
145. Id. at 476. 
146. 2007 ND 8, 726 N.W.2d 210. 
147. In re Buresh, ¶ 15, 726 N.W.2d 210, 214-15. 
148. Id. ¶ 4, 726 N.W.2d at 212. 
149. Rule 1.15(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall hold property of clients or 
third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
lawyer’s own property.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(a).  Rule 1.15(b) provides in pertinent 
part that “[u]pon receiving, in connection with a representation, funds or other property in which a 
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. . . .  
[A] lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the 
client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall 
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(b). 
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misappropriating client funds and recommended an eighteen-month 
suspension.150 
Although neither party filed objections to the hearing panel’s report 
and recommendation, the court requested each party to brief the issue.151  
Disciplinary counsel argued to the court that Buresh should be disbarred, 
while Buresh argued that a six-month suspension would be more appro-
priate.152  The court considered the positions of the hearing panel, discipli-
nary counsel, and Buresh himself before identifying the following as aggra-
vating factors favoring harsher disciplinary action: Buresh had allegedly 
failed to repay the client; he allegedly repeatedly lied to the third person 
entitled to receive the funds; and, the amount involved was a large sum of 
money.153  The court ordered the discipline sought by disciplinary counsel 
and disbarred Attorney Buresh.154 
D. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
In the period from 2004 through 2007, the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota has acted on two hearing panel recommendations concerning con-
flicts of interest.  In In re Christensen,155 the court accepted the recommen-
dation of a hearing panel that Douglas A. Christensen be reprimanded for 
his misconduct.156  In In re Bullis,157 however, the court suspended James 
R. Bullis for ninety days after rejecting the recommendation of a hearing 
panel that he be merely reprimanded for his misconduct.158 
In 2005, the Supreme Court of North Dakota issued a public reprimand 
against Attorney Christensen.159  In that case, University Hotel Develop-
ment (“UHD”) retained Christensen’s partners, Jensen and Gaustad, in 
November 2001 to represent it in its efforts to develop the Hilton Garden 
Inn in Grand Forks, North Dakota.160  UHD instructed Gaustad and Jensen 
not to inform Christensen of the representation because, as a member of the 
Grand Forks City Council, Christensen would be called upon to vote on 
matters related to the UHD project.161  After learning of the representation 
 
150. In re Buresh, ¶ 5, 726 N.W.2d at 212. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. ¶ 8, 726 N.W.2d at 213. 
153. Id. ¶ 13, 726 N.W.2d at 214. 
154. Id. ¶ 15. 
155. 2005 ND 87, 696 N.W.2d 495. 
156. In re Christensen, ¶ 15, 696 N.W.2d at 498. 
157. 2006 ND 228, 723 N.W.2d 667. 
158. In re Bullis, ¶ 15, 723 N.W.2d 667, 675-76. 
159. In re Christensen, ¶ 17, 696 N.W.2d at 498. 
160. Id. ¶ 3, 696 N.W.2d at 495. 
161. Id. 
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in mid-January 2002,162 Christensen allegedly failed to adopt adequate 
precautions to assess potential conflicts of interest arising from his position 
as partner to Gaustad and Jensen, and also as a City Council Member.163 
In an unrelated matter, Christensen represented Stephen Boone, co-
trustee to Ralph Boone’s trust, in a petition seeking guardianship of Ralph 
when Ralph married, despite the fact that Ralph was also Christensen’s 
client.164  In yet another matter, Christensen filed mechanic’s liens on be-
half of Lumber Mart against homeowners who had purchased homes from 
Cameo Homes, a client of Jensen.165  Christensen recognized the conflict 
when Cameo Homes was first brought into the action through a third-party 
complaint, but he continued to represent Lumber Mart through settlement, 
even after he was unable to obtain a waiver of the conflict from Cameo 
Homes.166 
Disciplinary counsel and Attorney Christensen entered into a 
Stipulation and Consent to Discipline, in which both parties agreed that 
Christensen be reprimanded.167  Consistent with the Stipulation and Con-
sent, a hearing panel determined that Christensen violated the North Dakota 
Rules of Professional Conduct cautioning against conflicts of interest in 
three separate instances.168  The hearing panel recommended that the court 
issue a reprimand in accordance with the Stipulation and Consent.169  
Without addressing why the hearing panel’s recommended sanction was 
appropriate, the court issued a reprimand.170 
The court did not consider its next conflict of interest matter for over a 
year, when it decided Bullis.  Attorney Bullis allegedly set up several hold-
ing companies to enable Michael Volk to transfer options in Intellisol stock 
to investors.  Bullis allegedly received a five percent commission on the 
sale of such stock options to a group of investors named the Fargo Capital 
Group.  Bullis, after representing Volk in a sale of stock options to James 
Ellefson, then represented Ellefson in certain estate planning matters.  
Bullis later allegedly represented Intellisol in a sale of stock warrants 
 
162. Id. 
163. Id. ¶ 4, 696 N.W.2d at 495-96. 
164. Id. ¶¶ 5-7, 696 N.W.2d at 496. 
165. Id. ¶ 9, 696 N.W.2d at 497. 
166. Id. ¶ 10. 
167. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. 
168. Id. ¶¶ 11-15.  Rule 1.7(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out a course of action on behalf of the client will 
be adversely affected by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by 
the lawyer’s own interests.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7(a). 
169. In re Christensen, ¶ 15, 696 N.W.2d at 498. 
170. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. 
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directly to Ellefson.  Ellefson believed that Bullis was representing him in 
this transaction.171 
Intellisol later defaulted its creditors, including Ellefson and the Fargo 
Capital Group, and Bullis represented both Ellefson and Intellisol’s land-
lord, Kevin Christianson, in a workout agreement.  Ellefson was unaware 
that Bullis also represented Christianson.  Bullis then allegedly represented 
Ellefson in renewing his note on Intellisol stock warrants.  Bullis allegedly 
billed both Ellefson and Intellisol for this work on the workout agreement 
and the renewal of the note.172 
When Intellisol finally ceased operations, it was taken over by Work-
force ROI.  Bullis allegedly told Ellefson that he and other investors were 
interested in purchasing his interests in Workforce ROI; he added that he 
could not represent Ellefson in such a sale because it would create a conflict 
of interest.  Bullis allegedly recommended that Ellefson contact a new 
attorney, which advice Ellefson declined.  Bullis drafted an agreement by 
which he and other investors purchased Ellefson’s interest.173 
A hearing panel concluded that Bullis violated Rule 1.7(a)-(c) of the 
North Dakota Rules of Professional Responsibility174 because his ability to 
represent Ellefson was adversely affected by his responsibilities to other 
clients, third parties, and his own interests.175  The hearing panel further 
found that, because Bullis used his knowledge of clients’ investments to his 
advantage and failed to explain to Ellefson the implications of the conflict 
of interest when he advised Ellefson to obtain independent counsel, he had 
also violated Rule 1.8(a) and (b).176  Accordingly, the hearing panel 
recommended that the court issue a reprimand.177 
 
171. In re Bullis, 2006 ND 228, ¶ 7, 723 N.W.2d 667, 669. 
172. Id. ¶ 8, 723 N.W.2d at 670. 
173. Id. ¶ 9. 
174. Rule 1.7(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer’s ability to 
consider, recommend, or carry out a course of action on behalf of the client will be adversely 
affected by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s 
own interests.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7(a).  Rule 1.7(b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not 
represent a client when the lawyer’s own interests are likely to adversely affect the representa-
tion.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7(b).  Rule 1.7(c) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent 
a client if the representation of that client might be adversely affected by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: (1) 
[t]he lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) [t]he 
client consents after consultation.  When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common 
representation and the advantages and risks involved.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7(c). 
175. In re Bullis, ¶ 11, 723 N.W.2d at 670. 
176. Id. Rule 1.8(a) provides that “a lawyer shall not enter into a business, financial or 
property transaction with a client unless: (1) [t]he transaction is fair and reasonable to the client; 
and (2) [a]fter consultation, including advice to seek independent counsel, the client consents to 
the transaction.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.8(a).  Rule 1.8(b) provides that “a lawyer shall not 
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Attorney Bullis objected to the report and recommendation of the hear-
ing panel178 and disciplinary counsel opposed his argument.179  The court, 
nonetheless, accepted the hearing panel’s findings that Bullis violated Rule 
1.7(a)-(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Responsibility,180 as 
well as Rule 1.8(a) and (b).181  The court, however, held that a reprimand is 
not a sufficiently harsh sanction where an attorney’s simple negligence re-
sults in substantial injury to the client.182  The court, thus, rejected the hear-
ing panel’s recommendation that a reprimand was a sufficient sanction.183  
Instead, the court determined that Bullis acted with knowledge resulting in 
“potential injury, if not actual injury,” and suspended Bullis for ninety 
days.184 
E. UNREASONABLE FEES 
Twice since 2004, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has considered 
recommendations from hearing panels concerning the unreasonable prac-
tices of attorneys in charging fees.  In In re Madlom,185 the court repri-
manded Bruce L. Madlom for allegedly demanding that his client, who had 
paid Madlom upfront to file a bankruptcy petition on her behalf, also pay 
her daughter’s outstanding legal bill to Madlom before he would file the 
bankruptcy petition.186  In In re Hellerud,187 the court accepted the 
recommendation of a hearing panel that it reprimand Mark R. Hellerud for 
charging unreasonable fees.188 
In 2004, the court reprimanded Attorney Madlom and ordered that he 
refund amounts allegedly overcharged to clients.189  In that case, Bonnie 
Bell retained Madlom’s services to file a bankruptcy petition for $750.190  
Bell also agreed to assume responsibility for her adult daughter’s 
 
use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client for purposes 
of furthering either the lawyer’s or another person’s interest unless after consultation, including 
advice to seek independent counsel, the client consents.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.8(b). 
177. In re Bullis, ¶ 11, 723 N.W.2d at 670-71. 
178. Id. ¶ 1, 723 N.W.2d at 668. 
179. Id. ¶ 22, 723 N.W.2d at 674. 
180. Id. ¶ 17, 723 N.W.2d at 673. 
181. Id. ¶ 21, 723 N.W.2d at 674. 
182. Id. ¶ 28, 723 N.W.2d at 675-76. 
183. Id. ¶ 25, 723 N.W.2d at 675. 
184. Id. ¶ 28, 723 N.W.2d at 675-76. 
185. 2004 ND 206, 688 N.W.2d 923. 
186. In re Madlom, ¶ 3, 688 N.W.2d at 924. 
187. 2006 ND 105, 714 N.W.2d 38. 
188. In re Hellerud, ¶ 1, 714 N.W.2d at 39. 
189. In re Madlom, ¶¶ 7-11, 688 N.W.2d at 924-25. 
190. Id. ¶ 2, 688 N.W.2d at 923. 
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outstanding legal bill in the amount of $1,157.90 and made arrangements 
for a payment plan on that amount.191  Later, Madlom allegedly refused to 
file Bell’s bankruptcy petition until she paid off her daughter’s debt to 
him.192  Bell terminated Madlom and demanded a refund of the fees paid 
for the bankruptcy petition which was never filed.193 
Disciplinary counsel and Attorney Madlom entered into a Stipulation 
and Consent to Discipline in which Madlom admitted the violations alleged 
in the petition and accepted discipline in the form of a reprimand.194  A 
hearing panel determined that Madlom violated Rule 1.5(a) of the North 
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct,195 among others, when he failed to 
refund to Bell unearned legal fees for the bankruptcy services that he failed 
to provide.196  The hearing panel accepted the parties’ Stipulation and Con-
sent and recommended that the court issue a reprimand against Attorney 
Madlom.197  The court accepted the report and recommendation of the hear-
ing panel, issued a reprimand, and ordered Madlom to refund to Bell the 
unearned fees.198 
The court revisited the issue of unreasonable fees two years later in 
Hellerud.199  In that case, Mark Hellerud charged Edward Kraft $275 an 
hour to administer his brother’s estate, valued at approximately $65,000.200  
Hellerud generally charged $200 an hour for probate matters, but explained 
to Kraft that he needed to charge more because he was unfamiliar with 
North Dakota probate matters.201  In addition, Hellerud billed Kraft for the 
time of his legal assistant at the rate of $275, arguing that his outdated 
billing system prevented him from distinguishing between the two.202 
A hearing panel concluded that Hellerud violated Rule 1.5(a) which 
requires that an attorney’s rate be reasonable203 and recommended that the 
court reprimand him.204  Attorney Hellerud filed objections to the hearing 
 
191. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 688 N.W.2d at 923-24. 
192. Id. ¶ 4, 688 N.W.2d at 924. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. ¶ 6, 688 N.W.2d at 924. 
195. Rule 1.5(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.”  N.D. 
R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a). 
196. In re Madlom, ¶ 3, 688 N.W.2d at 924. 
197. Id. ¶ 7. 
198. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 12, 688 N.W.2d at 924-25. 
199. In re Hellerud, 2006 ND 105, ¶ 20, 714 N.W.2d 38, 44. 
200. Id. ¶ 2, 714 N.W.2d at 39-40. 
201. Id. at 40. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. ¶ 5, 714 N.W.2d at 40.  Rule 1.5(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer’s fee 
shall be reasonable.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(a). 
204. Id. ¶ 5, 714 N.W.2d at 40. 
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panel’s report and recommendation.205  The court, nonetheless, followed the 
recommendation of the hearing panel and issued a reprimand and an order 
that he refund to the estate the amount in which he overbilled it.206 
F. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE 
Since 2004, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has considered the 
issue of unauthorized practice only one time.207  In the case of In re 
Giese,208 a hearing panel recommended that the court suspend Bryan L. 
Giese for sixty days for practicing law while suspended and for committing 
various additional violations in connection with such practice.209  In that 
case, Giese had been suspended from the practice of law on June 3, 2003, 
for ninety days commencing on August 1, 2003.210  After the suspension 
was issued, but before it became effective, Giese provided legal services to 
Ronald and Nancy Getsman.211  On August 5, 2003, the Getsman’s sched-
uled an appointment to meet with Giese on August 12, 2003.212  When the 
Getsman’s learned of Giese’s suspension, they cancelled their appointment 
to meet with him.213  Giese explained to the hearing panel that he was 
acting in his capacity as legal assistant to Attorney Benjamin Pulkrabek 
when he anticipated meeting with the Getsmans.214 
The hearing panel determined that, among other things, Giese violated 
Rule 5.5 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct.215  Thus, the 
hearing panel recommended that the court suspend him from the practice of 
law for a period of sixty days.216  Giese filed objections to the report and 
recommendation of the hearing panel.217 
Because the Getsmans believed Giese to be a licensed attorney and 
because Giese allegedly failed to inform them that he was suspended from 
the practice of law, the court agreed with the findings of the hearing panel 
and found that Giese held himself out as licensed to practice law while he 
 
205. Id. ¶ 6. 
206. Id. ¶ 25, 714 N.W.2d at 44. 
207. In re Giese, 2006 ND 13, 709 N.W.2d 717. 
208. Id. ¶ 2, 709 N.W.2d at 718. 
209. Id. ¶ 1. 
210. Id. ¶ 2. 
211. Id. ¶ 3. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. ¶ 4, 709 N.W.2d at 718-19. 
215. Id. ¶ 6, 709 N.W.2d at 719.  Rule 5.5(d) provides: “A lawyer who is not admitted to 
practice in this jurisdiction shall not represent or hold out to the public that the lawyer is admitted 
to practice law in this jurisdiction.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.5(d). 
216. In re Giese, ¶ 6, 709 N.W.2d at 720. 
217. Id. ¶ 1, 709 N.W.2d at 718. 
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was suspended.218  Because Giese also attempted to mislead the court in an 
affidavit in which he allegedly certified that he complied with the terms of 
his suspension, the court found his misconduct to be intentional and issued 
the recommended sanction of a suspension for sixty days.219 
G. HARASSMENT OR INTIMIDATION 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has considered only one case 
since 2004 focused primarily on misconduct by an attorney in the form of 
harassment or intimidation against a member of the public.  In In re 
Mertz,220 the court rejected the recommendation of a hearing panel that it 
suspend Monty G. Mertz for one month for allegedly attempting to 
intimidate an individual to dissuade him from proceeding against Mertz’s 
daughter for a vicious dog complaint by threatening the individual with a 
defamation suit.221  Instead, the court issued a public reprimand of Mertz.222 
The matter leading to the reprimand in Mertz arose from an incident in 
a West Fargo park in which Meagan Mertz, Monty Mertz’s daughter, al-
legedly was walking her dogs unleashed.223  Gary Allen Hanson approached 
Ms. Mertz when one of her dogs bit Hanson.224  Hanson signed complaints 
against Meagan Mertz for violating city ordinances against vicious dogs 
and against unlicensed animals.225 
Mertz sent Hanson a letter identifying himself as counsel to Meagan 
Mertz.  In the letter, Mertz allegedly accused Hanson of defaming Meagan 
Mertz when he signed the complaints against her and Mertz included a draft 
complaint in defamation.  In the letter, Mertz referred to Hanson as an 
animal hater and abuser.  The letter continued, “If you wish to minimize the 
consequences to you for your dishonesty, then you will agree to the dis-
missal of the charge you signed.”  Mertz offered to settle the defamation 
claim in exchange for Hanson’s dismissal of the complaints against Meagan 
Mertz.226 
 
218. Id. ¶ 14, 709 N.W.2d at 721. 
219. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 709 N.W.2d at 722. 
220. 2006 ND 85, 712 N.W.2d 849. 
221. In re Mertz, ¶¶ 8, 13, 712 N.W.2d at 852-53. 
222. Id.¶ 25, 712 N.W.2d at 855. 
223. Id. ¶ 2, 721 N.W.2d at 851. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. ¶ 3. 
226. Id. ¶ 5. 
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A hearing panel concluded that Mertz violated Rule 3.4(a) of the North 
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct,227 which prohibits an attorney from 
unlawfully obstructing another party’s access to evidence.228  The hearing 
panel determined that Mertz also violated Rule 4.4 of the North Dakota 
Rules of Professional Conduct229 by using language in his letter to Hanson 
designed to embarrass and intimidate Hanson from giving evidence in the 
vicious dog complaint.230  The hearing panel recommended that the court 
suspend Attorney Mertz from the practice of law for a period of one 
month.231 
Both disciplinary counsel and Attorney Mertz filed objections to the 
report and recommendation of the hearing panel.232  The court determined 
that Mertz’s letter to Hanson was permissible in most respects, finding 
facial validity in Meagan Mertz’s defamation complaint.  Thus, the court 
found no violation of Rule 3.4(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Professional 
Conduct.233  Nonetheless, the court agreed with the finding of the hearing 
panel that Mertz violated Rule 4.4 of the North Dakota Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct when he used language in his letter to Hanson designed to 
embarrass and intimidate Hanson from giving evidence in the vicious dog 
complaint.234  Specifically, the court found Mertz’s accusations that Hanson 
was an animal abuser and hater inappropriate.235 
Ultimately, because the underlying circumstances concerned Mertz’s 
daughter, the court determined that the situation was exceptional and 
unlikely to occur in the future.  Thus, the court rejected the recommenda-
tion of the hearing panel for a suspension and opted instead to publicly 
reprimand Mertz.236 
 
227. Rule 3.4(a) provides in pertinent part that a lawyer shall not “unlawfully obstruct 
another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other 
material having potential evidentiary value.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4(a). 
228. In re Mertz, ¶ 6, 712 N.W.2d at 851-52. 
229. Rule 4.4 provides, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall not use means that have no 
substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining 
evidence that violate the legal rights of such person.”  N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 4.4. 
230. In re Mertz, ¶ 6, 712 N.W.2d at 851-52. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. ¶¶ 8, 14, 712 N.W.2d at 852-53.  Disciplinary counsel argued that Attorney Mertz’s 
conduct warranted a suspension of six months.  Id. ¶ 23, 712 N.W.2d at 854. 
233. Id. ¶ 13, 712 N.W.2d at 853. 
234. Id. ¶ 18. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. ¶ 25, 712 N.W.2d at 855. 
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H. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
A great deal of recent media attention has focused on the sensation-
alized tales of sexual misconduct by attorneys in North Dakota.  When a 
hearing panel soon makes a recommendation in In re Overboe,237  the court 
 
237. In re Overboe, 2006 ND 249, ¶ 2, 724 N.W.2d 576, 576.  On December 4, 2006, the 
court granted the request of disciplinary counsel for an interim suspension against David A. 
Overboe.  Id. ¶ 14, 724 N.W.2d at 579. 
 That case involved an incident in October 2006 wherein Overboe allegedly engaged in sexual 
conduct with a female client and attempted to exact sexual favors in lieu of payment for legal fees.  
Id. ¶ 2, 724 N.W.2d at 576.  In his Application for Interim Suspension of David A. Overboe, 
Disciplinary counsel asserted that Overboe was charged with one count of sexual assault and two 
counts of hiring an individual to engage in sexual activity.  Id.  After filing the initial Application, 
disciplinary counsel filed multiple supplements, most in the form of Affidavits.  Id. ¶ 7, 724 
N.W.2d at 577.  In addition to the allegations alleged in the initial Application, disciplinary 
counsel added that Overboe had been charged with an additional count of sexual assault and 
disorderly conduct concerning an incident in which Overboe allegedly attempted to kiss another 
female client.  Id. Disciplinary counsel also related an incident in which a female client of 
Overboe’s refused to exchange sexual favors for payment of legal fees.  Id. ¶ 8, 724 N.W.2d at 
577-78.  Overboe billed this client four years later for the underlying bill and late fees, doubling 
the costs of the original fee.  Id.  Disciplinary counsel then submitted an Affidavit detailing a 
situation in which Overboe allegedly attempted to meet with another female client after hours, 
offered her alcohol, and called her at home to ask her out for drinks and to inquire whether her 
divorce was final.  Id. ¶ 9, 724 N.W.2d at 578.  Finally, disciplinary counsel submitted an 
Affidavit describing encounters between Overboe and several female clients.  Id. ¶ 10.  
Specifically, the Affidavit described: 
a) In events occurring in 1998 or 1999, Overboe offered to exchange legal fees for 
sexual favors with a female client.  This client filed a Complaint with the Disciplinary 
Board, which resulted in an admonition to Overboe. 
b) In events occurring approximately 14 years ago, Overboe made overtures to a 
female client by sending flowers and a purse full of silver coins with writing on them.  
On the day her case was completed, Overboe took this client to the Holiday Inn where 
sex was exchanged for his legal fee. 
c) In events occurring in 1994, Overboe offered a female client alcohol, requested 
meeting after normal business hours, discussed different ways she could make pay-
ments on her bill, and offered her a trip to Las Vegas.  Approximately four years after 
she stopped contact with Overboe, she received a judgment on her legal fees, 
including late charges.  The late charges were removed from her bill after she 
mentioned these incidents. 
d) In events occurring in 1999, Overboe met with a female client after normal business 
hours; when she arrived, Overboe was drinking and offered her alcohol.  After this 
meeting, the client would not meet with Overboe alone.  When she brought a friend, 
Overboe offered both of them alcohol.  Overboe made several references about the 
cost of his legal services had he not agreed to do her case without a fee. 
e) In events occurring from 1995 through 1996, a client’s female secretary brought 
papers to Overboe.  During one meeting, Overboe proceeded to unzip his pants and 
expose himself to her, and tried to have sex with her.  After this meeting, Overboe 
called her many times, but never discussed the case.  The client was billed for the 
personal phone calls Overboe made to the client’s secretary. 
f) In events occurring in January 2006 that correspond with the charges in the 
Information in Cass Co. No. 06-K-4307, Overboe met with a female client after 
normal business hours.  Overboe offered her alcohol, and he appeared to be intoxi-
cated.  When the client was leaving, Overboe assisted her with her jacket, then 
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will consider this issue.  Aside from the Overboe case which has not yet 
been considered for final determination, the supreme court has only disci-
plined one attorney since 2004 for sexual misconduct.238  As discussed 
above, a great deal of the attorney misconduct in the case of In re 
Chinquist, in fact, surrounded misappropriation, rather than sexual miscon-
duct.239  The media attention paid to attorney sexual misconduct may be 
largely overblown. 
IV. EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH 
DAKOTA’S CONSIDERATION OF DISCIPLINARY CASES 
Since 2004, a number of interesting trends have emerged from the 
consideration by the Supreme Court of North Dakota of the recommenda-
tions of hearing panels assigned to report to the court on disciplinary 
matters.  Although no real pattern has emerged regarding the timing of the 
court’s consideration, for example, moving from harsher discipline in 2004 
to lighter discipline in 2007, trends have developed associating certain 
violations with a specific range of discipline, as well as concerning the 
probability that an objection may result in a harsher or lighter sanction than 
that recommended by a hearing panel. 
Initially, this article notes that the Supreme Court of North Dakota has 
issued sanctions ranging from dismissal of the petition240 to disbarment241 
since 2004.  The court has imposed a variety of sanctions against attorneys 
found to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct requiring compe-
tence and diligence, including both dismissal and disbarment.242  That full 
range of sanctions, however, has not been issued for every type of violation.  
Those attorneys found to have violated the Rules through fraud or 
misappropriation have received sanctions varying from reprimand to 
 
grabbed her, pulled her toward him and tried to kiss her.  He offered to work 
something out with her regarding his legal fee and offered her a trip to Cancun. 
Id.  Based on the information provided by disciplinary counsel, the court ordered Overboe 
suspended pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceeding against him.  Id. ¶ 14, 724 
N.W.2d at 579.  The court additionally considered the allegations in the Application that Overboe 
engaged in a pattern of meeting with female clients after hours, offering those clients alcohol, 
making inappropriate comments to them, and engaging in sexual conduct with them, sometimes in 
exchange for the payment of Overboe’s legal bills.  Id. ¶ 2, 724 N.W.2d at 576. 
238. In re Chinquist, 2006 ND 107, ¶¶ 22, 24, 714 N.W.2d 469, 475-76. 
239. See supra Part III.C for a detailed discussion of the court’s analysis in In re Chinquist. 
240. In re Hoffman, 2005 ND 153, ¶ 11, 703 N.W.2d 345, 346 (incompetence). 
241. In re Buresh, 2007 ND 8, ¶ 15, 726 N.W.2d 210, 214-15 (misappropriation); In re 
Wilkes, 2005 ND 168, ¶ 7, 704 N.W.2d 809, 809 (fraud); In re Schoppert, 2005 ND 45, ¶ 6, 693 
N.W.2d 19, 20 (fraud); In re Peterson, 2004 ND 205, ¶ 13, 689 N.W.2d 364, 366 (incompetence). 
242. Compare In re Hoffman, ¶ 1, 703 N.W.2d at 346 (dismissing petition charging attorney 
with incompetence) with In re Peterson, ¶ 13, 689 N.W.2d at 366 (ordering disbarment of attorney 
for incompetence). 
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disbarment.243  The court has imposed sanctions from reprimand to a 
ninety-day suspension upon those found to have maintained conflicts of 
interest.244  The court has punished the unauthorized practice of law with a 
sixty-day suspension245 and issued only a reprimand in each case involving 
harassment246 or unreasonable fees.247  While there exists no hard and fast 
rule limiting the court in its discretion to sanction attorneys for disciplinary 
misconduct, a pattern does exist by which one can compare the sanction 
imposed to the violation charged. 
More interesting and apparent, however, is the correlation demon-
strated over the past several years between the position disciplinary counsel 
and the attorney in question take to the report and recommendation of the 
hearing panel and the sanction imposed by the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota.  Three separate factors distinguish themselves in this pattern.  First, 
there exists a statistical correlation between the decision of the attorney in 
question and disciplinary counsel to enter into a Stipulation and Consent to 
Discipline and the decision by the court to accept the recommendation of 
the hearing panel.248  Second, there exists an interesting correlation between 
an attorney’s decision to object to the report and recommendation of the 
hearing panel and the court’s decision to either accept the hearing panel’s 
recommendations or to issue a sanction more or less harsh than that 
recommended.249  Finally, there is a surprising correlation between the 
action of disciplinary counsel to object to the recommendation of the 
hearing panel and the court’s decision to reject the hearing panel’s 
recommendation and instead issue a harsher sanction.250  Although a 
statistical analysis of past decisions cannot guarantee the treatment by the 
court in a specific case, the results are startling enough to consider in 
 
243. In re Buresh, ¶ 15, 726 N.W.2d at 214-15 (disbarring attorney for misappropriation); In 
re Stensland, 2006 ND 251, ¶ 12, 725 N.W.2d 191, 193 (issuing sixty-day suspension for fraud); 
In re Edison, ¶ 17, 724 N.W.2d at 585 (ordering reprimand for fraud); In re Korsmo, 2006 ND 
148, ¶ 13, 718 N.W.2d 6, 9 (issuing six-month suspension for fraud); In re Chinquist, 2006 ND 
107, ¶ 17, 714 N.W.2d 469, 476 (ordering attorney suspended for six months for 
misappropriation); In re Wilkes, ¶ 17, 704 N.W.2d at 809 (disbarring attorney for fraud); In re 
Ward, 2005 ND 144, ¶ 24, 701 N.W.2d 873, 878 (reprimanding attorney for misappropriation); In 
re Schoppert, ¶ 6, 693 N.W.2d at 20 (disbarring attorney for fraud). 
244. Compare In re Christensen, 2005 ND 87, ¶ 15, 696 N.W.2d 495, 498 (reprimanding 
attorney for maintaining conflict of interest) with In re Bullis, 2006 ND 228, ¶ 28, 723 N.W.2d 
667, 675-76 (issuing ninety-day suspension for conflict of interest). 
245. In re Giese, 2006 ND 13, ¶ 1, 709 N.W.2d 717, 718. 
246. In re Mertz, 2006 ND 85, ¶ 1, 712 N.W.2d 849, 851. 
247. In re Hellerud, 2006 ND 105, ¶ 1, 714 N.W.2d 38, 39; In re Madlom, 2004 ND 206, ¶ 
10, 688 N.W.2d 923, 924. 
248. See infra notes 255-257 and accompanying text. 
249. See infra notes 258-260 and accompanying text. 
250. See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
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determining how to proceed in light of a hearing panel’s report and 
recommendation. 
It is useful to note that, since 2004, the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
has accepted the recommendation of a hearing panel in every case in which 
the attorney in question and disciplinary counsel have entered a Stipulation 
and Consent to Discipline.251  In each stipulation, the attorney admitted to 
the violations charged and consented to a specific sanction to which disci-
plinary counsel agreed.252  In each case where such an agreement has been 
reached between the parties since 2004, the court has issued the sanction the 
hearing panel recommended.253  This appears to be strong statistical evi-
dence that the supreme court will order the recommended sanction where an 
attorney consents to such discipline. 
Only nine attorneys have filed objections to the report and recommen-
dation of a hearing panel in the twenty-one cases the court has considered 
since 2004.254  In one third of those cases, the court accepted the original 
recommendation of the hearing panel, regardless of the attorney’s objec-
tions.255  Interestingly, the only three cases since 2004 in which the court 
issued a sanction less severe than that recommended by the hearing panel 
involved situations where the attorney objected to the recommendation.256  
For those three attorneys, objecting led to a successful outcome.  Unfortu-
nately for three different attorneys, representing the final third of those who 
objected, the court issued a harsher sanction than that recommended by the 
hearing panel in three of the nine cases in which an attorney objected.257  
Objecting has proven the only method for receiving a sanction less than that 
 
251. E.g., In re McKechnie, 2006 ND 7, ¶ 10, 708 N.W.2d 310, 312; In re Wilkes, 2005 ND 
168, ¶ 17, 704 N.W.2d 809, 809; In re Sundby, 2005 ND 135, ¶ 16, 701 N.W.2d 863, 865; In re 
Christensen, 2005 ND 87, ¶ 16, 696 N.W.2d 495, 498; In re Schoppert, 2005 ND 45, ¶ 6, 693 
N.W.2d 19, 20; In re Madlom, ¶ 9, 688 N.W.2d at 924; In re Secrest, 2004 ND 180, ¶ 7, 687 
N.W.2d 251, 252. 
252. See cases cited supra in note 251 (noting cases in which the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota has accepted the recommendation of a hearing panel in cases in which the disciplinary 
counsel and the attorney in question had entered a Stipulation and Consent to Discipline). 
253.  See cases cited supra in note 251 (noting cases in which the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota followed the hearing panel’s recommended sanction). 
254. E.g., In re Edison, 2006 ND 148, ¶ 18, 724 N.W.2d 579, 585; In re Korsmo, 2006 ND 
6, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d 6, 9; In re Chinquist, 2006 ND 107, ¶ 23, 714 N.W.2d 469, 476; In re 
Hellerud, 2006 ND 105, ¶ 7, 714 N.W.2d 38, 39; In re Mertz, 2006 ND 85, ¶ 7, 712 N.W.2d at 
852; In re Giese, 2006 ND 13, ¶ 1, 709 N.W.2d 717, 718; In re Hoffman, ¶ 1, 703 N.W.2d at 346; 
In re Ward, 2005 ND 144, ¶ 9, 701 N.W.2d 873, 878; In re Edin, 2005 ND 109, ¶ 7, 697 N.W.2d 
727, 728-29. 
255. E.g., In re Hellerud, ¶ 1, 714 N.W.2d at 39; In re Giese, ¶ 1, 709 N.W.2d at 718; In re 
Ward, ¶ 1, 701 N.W.2d at 874. 
256. E.g., In re Korsmo, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 9; In re Mertz, ¶ 7, 712 N.W.2d at 852; In re 
Hoffman, ¶ 1, 703 N.W.2d at 346. 
257. E.g., In re Edison, ¶ 18, 724 N.W.2d at 585; In re Chinquist, ¶ 1, 714 N.W.2d at 470; In 
re Edin, ¶ 1, 697 N.W.2d at 728-29. 
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recommended by a hearing panel since 2004, but it has also led to a one in 
three chance or receiving a harsher sanction. 
The final factor which distinguishes itself as playing a significant role 
in the Supreme Court’s disciplinary decisions is the filing of an objection 
by disciplinary counsel.  In three out of the five cases in which disciplinary 
counsel has objected to the recommendation of a hearing panel since 2004, 
the court rejected the hearing panel’s recommendation and opted instead to 
issue a sanction more severe than that which the hearing panel recom-
mended.258  Stated otherwise, the Supreme Court of North Dakota is more 
likely to accept an argument made by disciplinary counsel than a recom-
mendation offered by a hearing panel, where disciplinary counsel opts to 
file an objection.259 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite headlines in the media to the contrary, North Dakota is not 
besieged by attorney violations of the North Dakota Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  The behavior of only twenty-one attorneys has reached the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota for final disposition since 2004.  And, 
unlike the headlines, the court has disciplined only one attorney for sexual 
misconduct during that same period. 
Studying those cases, nonetheless provides the opportunity to examine 
patterns in the disposition of disciplinary cases.  Specifically, it is apparent 
that, from 2004 to 2007, the court accepted the discipline recommended by 
a hearing panel with respect to every attorney who has consented to disci-
pline.  Those attorneys who have objected to the recommendation of the 
hearing panel, however, have submitted to a one in three chance that the 
court would issue the recommended discipline, issue a lesser sanction than 
recommended, or issue a sanction more severe than that which the hearing 
panel recommended.  Finally, in greater than half of those cases in which 
disciplinary counsel objected to the sanction recommended by a hearing 
panel, the court has rejected the hearing panel’s recommendation and in-
stead issued a sanction more severe.  While this study provides no 
guarantees as to how the court will handle individual cases in the future, it 
nonetheless may provide some insight into their recent actions. 
 
 
258. E.g., In re Edison, ¶ 18, 724 N.W.2d at 585; In re Chinquist, ¶ 1, 714 N.W.2d at 470; In 
re Mertz, ¶ 6, 712 N.W.2d at 852; In re Ward, ¶ 15, 701 N.W.2d at 878; In re Edin, ¶ 1, 697 
N.W.2d at 728-29. 
259. This result raises questions concerning the efficacy of the current system of handling 
disciplinary matters too significant to address in this article. 
